Abstracts of Recent Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. 841
justice may order such opposite party, or if the same be a body
corporate, then some officer thereof, to make answer on oath, at or
before a time to be fixed in said order, as to what document he so
has to the matter in dispute between the parties, or what he knows
as to the custody of such document, and if in his possession or con-
trol whether he objects to the production of the same and the
grounds of such objection, and thereupon such court or justice may
require the production of said document, or may compel the party
having the same in his possession or control to allow the applicant
to inspect the same, and if necessary to take examined copies of
the same, and may make such further order thereon as shall be
just.
This present motion is not framed in accordance with the statute
and it must be dismissed.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1
SUPREMIE COURT OF GEORGIA. 2
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.8
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY.4
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.5
BANK. See Corporation.
BROKERS.
Rig t to Commissons.--Brokers in whose hands property is placed
for sale, in order to earn commissions on account of the sale of such
property, must either have sold it or been the procuring cause of the
sale. If the purchaser, who was spoken to by them, had abandoned all
idea of the trade, and they had no influence at all in bringing it about,
they would not be entitled to commissions, although the purchaser may
subsequently have bought from the owner: Doonan v. Ives, 71 or
72 Ga.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from tle original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1884. The cases will probably appear in 113 U. S. Rep.
2 From J. H. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter ; the cases will probably appear in 71 or
72 Ga. Rep.
3 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 62 Md. Rep.
4 From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter; to appear in 39 N. J. Eq. Rep.
5 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 41 or
42 Ohio St. Rep.
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CoMM oN CARRIER.
Passenger Train-Fare of Child-jection from Railway Train-
.lfeasure of Damages-Punitive Damages.-A passenger on a railway
train is responsible for the fare of a child under his charge, and upon
refusal to pay the same, may,'together with -the child, be ejected from
the train, although he had paid his own fare: Phila., Wd. and Balt.
Railroad Co. v. Boeflich, 62 Md.
If a conductor on a railway train finds a child sitting beside a female
passenger, and knows that the father of the child is in the car, or could
know upon proper inquiry, he has no right to hold the female passenger
responsible for the child's fare : .d.
A passenger wrongfully ejected from a railway train 'is entitled to
recover from the railway company such damages as in the judgment of
the jury, under all the circumstances of the case, would be a proper
compensation for the unlawful invasion of his rights as a passebger, and
for the injury to his person and feelings : Id.
A passenger on a railway train, though forcibly and wrongfully
ejected from the train by an officer of the railway company, is not enti-
tled to punitive damages, if the wrongful act were committed in the
discharge of a supposed duty, or without any evil or bad intention: Id.
To entitle a person to punitive damages for a wrongful act, there
must be an element of fraud or malice, or evil 'intent, or oppression,
entering into and forming part of the act;: .d.
CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW.
Local Law-GenerdZ Law Local in form.-The clause of the con-
stitution providing that " all laws of a general nature shall have a uni-
form operation throughout the state," is not directory but mandatory,
and a statute in violation of it is void: .Ex- parte Falk, 41 or 42
Ohio St.
A statute providing punishment for an act which is malum in se
wherever committed, being a. law of a general nature, cannot be made
local on the ground that the inhibited act is a greater evil in a large
city than in other parts of the state,: Id.
Rev. Stats., sect. 1924, which provides punishment by fine and im-
prisonment against any person found in any city of the first grade of the
first class, or within four miles thereof, having burglar's tools in his
possession, is a law of a general nature within the inhibition of the con-
stitution, but being local in form it is void: Id.
CORPORATION.
Liability of Trustees or Directors for failure to file Report.-Where
a state statute required that every manufacturing, &c., corporation
formed under it should publish and file a report of its capital and debts
within twenty days after the first of the year; and provided that in case
of failure to do so all the trustees of the company should be liable for
"all the debts of the company then existing." Held, where there had
been such a failure, that the trustees were not liable for the amount of
a judgment recovered in a suit in tort against the company before the
first of the year in question: Chase v. Curtis, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1884.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Fraud of Officer-Liability of Corporation.-Where a transaction
with an incorporated banking association properly pertains to the busi-
ness of such an association, neither the abuse or disregard of his
authority by its managing officer or agent, nor his fraud or bad faith
will be permitted to be shown in defence of such bank in an action
against it by an innocent party growing out of such transaction : Citi-
zens' Say. Bank v. Blakesley, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
DAMAGES. See Common Carrier.
DivoRcE. See Husband and Fife.
DO-ICILE. See Husband and Fife.
EQUITY. See Specific Performance.
Bond of Trustees-I2nunction against Suit.-Where the trustees of
a corporation gave a bond, secured by a mortgage on the corporate pro-
perty, which, in strict legal effect, bound them individually, a court of
equity will enjoin an action at law against them thereon, if it appears
that there was no intention on their part to become personally liable
Maps v. Cooper, 39 N. J. Eq.
Agreemet between Father and Sons-Allowance for Services.-It
appearing that two sons had worked their father's farms, under an
agreement that they should do so until they had accumulated for him a
fund of $12,000, and then they should have the farms free of rent
during his life, and that the specified sum had been gathered about a
year before the. father's death, and thereafter the sons had enjoyed the
use of the farms free until their father died : Held, that the sons had
no reason to complain, on appeal, that the chancellor had made too
small an allowance to them for services rendered under that contract:
Larison v. Polhemus, 39 N. J. Eq.
Parties who, in their pleadings and proofs, have insisted that they
were not accountable to him for the rental value of land of which the
ancestor died seised, because they were in possession as equitable owners,
cannot, at the hearing, shift their ground, and claim that they were
tenants of the ancestor's widow, who might have been entitled to hold
the land until her dower was assigned, but who has disclaimed such a
right: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Promise to Pay for Goods Furnished to Another- Original Under-
talking.-G. wished to procure credit from P., but was refused. M.,
who had G. in his employment at the time, told P. to let G. have goods
and he would see it paid. The credit was given to M. and was refused
to be given to G.: Held, that such promise on the part of M. was an
original undertaking, and not an agreement to answer for the debt or
default of another. His promise to see it paid was the same as a pro-
mise to pay it himself, and so both parties understood the transaction at
the time: Maddox v. Pierce, 71 or 72 Ga.
HUSBAND AND WIPE.
Purchase by Wife at Judicial Sale-Personal Liability-Power to
bind separate Estate.-A married woman who purchases real estate at a
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trustee's sale, made under the sanction and direction of a court of equity,
and who pays a part of the purchase-money, but fails to pay the balance,
is personally liable therefor: Fowler v. Jacob, 62 Md.
A decree in personam against a feme covert, as purchaser, of real
estate sold under a decree in equity, to enforce the payment of the bal-
ance of the purchase-money, means only, that unless by a given time she
pays such balance, any of her separate property which. she would have
the right to pledge in order to pay or secure a debt, may be taken in
execution to pay what she owes on her purchase, or that such property
is liable therefor: Id.
A married woman has the power to charge her separate property with
the payment of her debts, and whether she does so or not, is a question
of intent: and this intent may be shown on the face of the obligation
creating the debt, or it may be shown aliunde : Id.
Divorce- Wife's Counsel Fees-Liablity of Estate of Deceased Hus-
band.-A widow cannot maintain an action against the administrator of
her deceased husband, for the amount of the fees charged by her counsel
for prosecuting a suit against him for a divorce a mensa et thlro, pend-
ing which suit he died: McCurley-v. Stockbridge, 62 Md.
But counsel themselves are entitled to recover from the administrator
of the deceased husband, reasonable fees for services rendered the wife
in a suit against the husband for a divorce, if it be made to appear affirm-
atively that the suit was reasonably and justifiably instituted: id.
Assignment of Account to Wife.-A son advanced money to his
mother for her support during her life, under an agreement that he
should be repaid at her death out of her estate. The son procured from
his wife the money advanced, agreeing that she should have the account
against his mother. Equity will enforce the claim in behalf of the
wife : Titus v. Hoagland, 39 N. J. Eq.
The parol assignment to the wife being unknown to the mother, a
counter-claim which she had against her son at her death will be set off
against this claim of the wife: Id.
Domicile-Descent of Property- Community.-Under the laws of
France, by a marriage without a contract as to property, a community
of property between the husband and wife is established as an incident
of the marriage. During coverture the husband has the control and
management of the community property, and he may dispose of his share
of the common property by his will; but the wife's share-that is, the
one-half of the community property-the husband cannot dispose of,
and she will be entitled to iD on his death: Harral v. Rarral 39
N. J. Eq.
A person sui fars may change'his domicile as often as he pleases.
To effect such a change, naturalization in the country he adopts as his
domicile is hot necessary : Id.
To effect a change of domicile there must be a voluntary change of
residence; the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be
actual; to the factum of residence there must be added animus manendi,
and that place is the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily
fixed his habitation, not for a mere temporary or special purpose, but
with a present intention of making it his home,-unless, or until some-
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
thing uncertain or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some
other place as his permanent home: Id.
By the laws of France, the marriage of a foreigner in France without
any contract as to property, followed by the establishment of a conjugal
domicile in that country, will subject the property of the married per-
sons to the community law, and a government authorization under article
xiii. of the code is not necessary to the establishment of such a dom-
icile : Id.
H., whose birthplace was in Connecticut, went to Europe in 1869, for
the purpose of acquiring the German language, and completing his pro-
fessional studies. In 1872 he went to Paris, where he remained; and,
in February 1877, married a French woman in Paris, without any con-
tract as to property. Immediately after the marriage he rented a house
at Suresnes, a village near Paris, for two years, and took up his resi-
dence there with his wife. In May 1878, he was brought to this coun-
try, and sent to a hospital for the insane, at Philadelphia, where he died
in 1881. Held, that by his marriage in France, and tie establishment
of his conjugal domicile there, his personal property became subject to
the community law, and that his widow, on his death, was entitled to Che
one-half part thereof, notwithstanding that by his will, made before
the marriage, he had bequeathed the whole of it to others: Id.
IN.TUNoTION. See Equity.
When it will Issue to Restrain Waste on Property in Litigation.-
Where irremediable mischief is being done or threatened, going to the
destruction of the substance of the estate, such as the extracting of ores
from a mine, or the cutting down of timber, or the removal of coal, an
injunction may issue to restrain the same as waste, though the title to
the premises be in litigation. The authorit-y of the court is exercised
in such cases, through its preventive writ, to preserve the property from
destruction pending legal proceedings for the determination of the title:
.Ehardt v. Boaro (No. 2), S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
INSURANCE.
Mfutual Beneficial Society-Payment to Family or Heirs-Right to
Appoint by Will.-A certificate of membership issued by an association
organized under the provisions of the Revised Statutes, sect. 3630, "for
the purpose of mutual protection and relief of its members, and for the
payment of stipulated sums of money to the families or heirs of the de-
ceased members," which, by its terms, is made payable to the assured
member, "or any person designated by his will or his heirs, if no person
is designated herein or by will," within ninety days after proof of death
of the assured member, does not authorize such member, by testamentary
appointment, to constitute a person a beneficiary of such insurance, who
is not of the family of the assured, or may not, upon his death, become
his heir: Nat. Mut. Aid Assoc. v. Gonser, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
A bequest by an assured member of such a company, of the proceeds
of his certificate of membership to a stranger or a creditor, does not con-
stitute such legatee an "heir" of the testator, in the statutory sense of
that term: 11.
Warranty-Avoidance of Policy by False Slatement-Fraudulent
Intent ,Aecessary.-Where a policy of insurance provides that any false
VOL. XXXIII.-44
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swearing or attempt at fraud, "'or if there shall appear any fraud in the
claim, by false swearing or otherwise," shall avoid such policy, the com-
pany, in order to avail itself of the defence, must show that the assured
knowingly and intentionally swore falsely, or said or did that which is
claimed to be fraudulent. There must be a wilful intent to defraud,
rather than an innocent mistake; and this condition of the policy
extends to every matter material to be stated, or which the policy in
terms requires to be stated: Watertown F're Insurance Co. v. Grehan,
71 or 72 Ga.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Prescription- Wrongful Occupation of Land.-lf a person takes pos-
session of land which he knows does not belong to him or any one from
whom he purchases, no prescription will run in his favor, ho'ever long
he may hold possession of the same. His possession, under such cir-
cumstances, originated in fraud, and time will not cure or sanctify the
fraud: Cowart v. Young, 71 or 72 Ga.
Continuing Nuisanee.-Every continuance of a nuisance is a renewal
of the wrong, and is actionable until abated. It is a nuisance to keep
up a sewer which, when it rains, throws upon a lot, and near the house
where the owner resides, excrement disagreeable to the smell, and hurt-
ful to health, and an action therefor, should not have been dismissed,
although the digging of the sewer was more than four years before the
bringing of the suit: Reid v. Atlanta,.7l or 72 Ga.
Mutual Accounts.-A mutual account is one based on a course of
dealing, wherein each party has given credit to the other, on the faith
of indebtedness to him: Gunn v. Gunn, 71 or 72 Ga.
If the items in favor of one side are mere payments on the indebted-"
ness to the other, the account is not mutual: Id.
In cases of such mutual acuounts, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run against either party, until the last just item in the account
on either side: Id.
This doctrine rests, not on the notion that every credit in favor of
one is an admission by him of indpbtedness to the other, or a new
promise to pay; but upon a mutual understanding, either express or
implied from the conduct of both parties, that they will continue to
credit each other until at least one desires to terminate the course of
confidential dealing; and that the balance will then be ascertained,
become then due, and be paid by the one finally indebted: d.
As this state of things rests on an express or implied mutual under-
standing, either party may terminate it, at any time, by an actual pay-
ment of the balance ; or by stating the account for that purpose ; or by
demanding a settlement privately; or by suit; or by any act which
plainly shows to the other party his determination to deal no longer
that way : Id.
Without proof of its termination the law presumes that such a mutual
understanding, once proved or admitted, runs through all the dealings
of the parties, until the complete bar of the statute has attached: id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Act of Servant-Responsibility of Master- Course of Employment.-
A master is not responsible for the acts of his servant, unless the latter
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was engaged in the performance of the service for which he was em-
ployed: Adams v. Cost, 62 Md.
Where a person placed his mare at livery, and instructed a servant of
the proprietors of the stable, to take her out for exercise, such, however,
being no part of the contract of livery, and while the servant had her
out for such purpose she died, the proprietors of the stable cannot be
held liable to the owner, though the mare was injured by, and died in
consequence of, the immoderate riding and carelessness of their ser-
vant : Id.
MINES AND MINING.
Discovery and Location-Notice of.-The discoverers of a lode or
vein posted at the point of discovery a plain sign, or notice in writing,
the body of which was as follows: " We, the undersigned, claim 1500
feet on this mineral-bearing lode, vein or deposit." .ield, that this
meant that they claimed 750 feet ou the course of the lode or vein in
each direction from that point, and that the notice was not deficient:
Erhardt v. Boaro, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
MORTGAGE.
Time of Recording-Presumption as to Lien-Arotice.-The pre-
sumption is, that the mortgage first recorded is the first lien ; and to
overcome such presumption, it must be proved that the mortgagee of
the mortgage first of record, at or before the time he took his mortgage,
had knowledge of the existence of the mortgage first in date: Hendrick
son v. Woolley, 39 N. J. Eq.
The notice, if any, must be taken with the qualifications attached to
it by the agreement of the mortgagee of the unrecorded mortgage; and
if such mortgagee has agreed with the mortgagor to keep his mortgage
off the record, in order that the mortgagor may borrow more money on
the property to be secured prior to such mortgage, and such agreement
be made known to the mortgagee of the mortgage second in date, but
first of record, at or before its execution, such notice will not give the
unrecorded mortgage priority: Id.
In such case the priority of the mortgage first in date is waived: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Will.
Subscription to the Stock of a Railroad-Special Tax for Pay-
ment of the Debt thereby lncurred.-A provision in a city charter
provided that the city council should have power to levy taxes on all
property within the city "to pay the debts and meet the general
expenses of said city, not exceeding fifty cents on each one hundred
dollars per annum on the annual assessed value thereof." Subsequently
the city was authorized to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad,
and issued bonds in payment of the stock it subscribed for. Held, that
despite the limitation in the charter, the authority to make the sub-
scription for the stock carried with it the right and the duty to levy and
collect a special tax, if necessary, to pay the debt incurred by the sub-
scription : Quincy v. Jackson, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Negligence-Exercise of Police Powers-Liability for Failure to
Perform.-In relation to powers and privileges which are to be exer-
cised by a municipal corporation for the improvement of the territory
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within the corporate limits, and as to which the pecuniary and propri-
etary interests of individuals are represented, the liability of the cor-
poration for negligence is largely, if not entirely, measured by the
liability of individuals for similar acts; but with respect to police
powers, such as suppressing riots and unlawful assemblages, such cor-
poration is, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, the
agent of the state, and not liable for a failure to perform or negligence
in performing duties in that particular imposed by statute: Robinson v.
Greenville, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
An assemblage of disorderly persons, after having been engaged for
several hours in discharging a cannon in a public street of a municipal
corporation, seriously injured a resident of the corporation, himself
without fault, by one of such discharges: Held, that such corporation is
not liable for the injury, although the statute provides that the council
shall have the care, supervision and control of the streets, "and shall
cause the same to be-kept open and in repair, and free from nuisance"
(Rev. Stats., § 2640), and it will make no difference that the authorities
of such corporation, with knowledge of such firing, took no steps to pre-
vent the same: Id.
Streets-Shade Trees-Rig.ht to Remove.-Sbade trees on the side-
walks and streets of a city belong to it, and in grading the streets and
sidewalks, they may be removed if necessary; and an adjoining pro-
perty owner certainly cannot recover therefor unless such damage was
caused by negligence or carelessness in the work: Castleberry v. Atlanta,
71 or 72 Ga.
NATiONAL BANK.
Taxation of Shares-At what reative Rate.-Under Sect. 5219 of
the Revised Statutes, the taxation of the shares of a national bank im-
posed by authority of the state within which the association is located,
is not to be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed
capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state." That the taxa-
tion imposed upon capital invested in national bank shares is no heavier
than that imposed upon capital invested in state bank shares, or in state
savings institutions, does not prevent its being an illegal discrimination,
if it results in the capital so invested not being upon the same footing
of substantial equality in respect of taxation by state authority as the
state establishes for other moneyed capital in the hands of individual
citizens, however invested: Boyer v. Boyer, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
NEGLIGENCF,. See Master and Servant; .Muni cpal Corporation.
Railroad-Right to Track-Trep ass-Negligence-Violation of
City Ordinance.-The right of way of a railroad company is the exclu-
sive property of such company, upon which no unauthorized person has
a right to be; and any one who travels upon such right of way as a
foot-way, and not for any business with the railroad, is a wrongdoer
and a trespasser ; and the mere acquiescence of the railroad company
in such user, does not give a right of way over the track, or create any
obligation for special protection: Balt. and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State,
62 Md.
Where a person trespassing upon such right of way was run over by
a train of cars and killed ; and the place where the accident occurred.
though within the corporate limits of the city of Baltimore, was not
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upon any street or public way where the person killed had a right to be,
it was held, that in the absence of other acts of negligence on the part
of the agents of the railroad company, the non-compliance with a city
ordinance requiring that "when a locomotive engine is used within the
limits of the city, a man shall be required to ride on the front of the
locomotive engine when going forward, and when going backward, on
the tender, not more than twelve inches from the bed of the road," did
not, per se, amount to such omission of a general and imperative duty
toward the deceased, as would render the company liable in an action
for damages resulting from his death: Id.
Railroad- Crossing Track -Contributory Negligence-Flagmen-
Duty to Look and Listen-Presumption.-The general principle is, that
where both parties by their negligence directly contribute to the produc-
tion of the accident, neither has a right to recover of the other for injuries
sustained thereby. But there are exceptions to this general rule; and if
the defendant or those acting for it, had become aware of the perilous
situation of the plaintiff, though that peril had been incurred by his
negligent or even reckless conduct, yet the defendant or its agents would
be bound to use all reasonable diligence to avoid the accident: tary-
land Central Railroad Co. v. Neuber, 62 Md.
But in order that. this qualification of, or exception to, the general
rule, may be successfully invoked by the plaintiff, he must show knowl-
edge on the part of the defendant, or its agents, of the peril in which
he, the plaintiff, was placed, and that there was time after such knowl-
edge within which to make the effort to save him from the impending
danger: Id.
In the absence of statutory requirement it is now well settled, at
least by a great preponderance of authority, that there is no legal obli-
gation on a railroad company to keep at the crossings of the public
country roads flagmen to give warning to travellers on such roads of the
passing of trains: Id.
Travellers about to cross a railroad track, should, in all cases, before
proceeding to cross, carefully look and listen, to ascertain whether a
train is approaching; and the failure on the part of those in charge of
the train to give the usual or required signals, such as blowing the
whistle or ringing the bell, will not excuse or justify the traveller on
the country roads, in attempting to cross a railroad track without the
exercise of that reasonable precaution, of looking and listening for the
approach of a train. And if the experiment be made without such pre-
caution, the party acts at his peril; and, if an accident occurs by a col-
lision with a passing train, the traveller must be held to have so far
contributed to his own misfortune as to preclude him the right to
recover against the railroad company: Id.
But if it be established as a fact, that the defendant, after discover-
ing the perilous situation of the plaintiff, could, by the exercise of rea-
sonable care, have avoided the collision, the want of care by the plaintiff
in driving upon the track, would be no answer to his right to re-
cover : Id.
While it is natural, and as a general rule rational, to presume that a
party acts from incentives of self-preservation, this presumption can
only be indulged in the absence of proof to the contrary: IdH
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.
Bonds of the United States-Negotiable althiugh called.-The five.
twenty United States consols of 1865 on their face were "Redeemable
at the pleasure of the United States after the 1st day of July 1870,
and payable on the 1st day of July 1885." The Act of July 14th
1870, which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to "call" them,
required a public notice, and provided that in three months after the
date thereof, interest should cease. Held, that the bonds continued ne-
gotiable after the expiration of the said three months, until the period
at which they Were originally made payable; and that therefore the bona
fide purchaser of such bonds, which had been stolen, bad a good title:
Morgan v. United States, S. C..U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
ORDINANCE. See Negligence; Sunday.
-Patent-Re.issue for the Purpose of Enlarging the Claim--A lar
Mistake and Promptness both .Necessary.-In order to obtain a re-issue
of a jatent for the mere purpose of enlarging the claim, there must be
both a clear mistake, inadvertently committed, in the wording of the
claim and an application for the re-issue within a reasonably short time.
Therefore, in this case, the court, being of opinion that there was -no
mistake in the wording of the claim of the original patent, held the
enlarged claims of the re-issue invalid, although the re-issue was applied
for a little over three months after the original patent was granted.
Coon v. Wilson, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Use of an old Device for a new Purpose.-Where the public has
acquired in any way the right to use a machine or device for a particular
purpose, it has the right to use it for all the like purposes to which it
can be applied. If there is any qualification of this rule, it is that if a
new and different result is obtained by a new application of an inven-
tion, such new application may be patented as an improvement on the
original invention; but if the result claimed as new is the same in
character as the original result, it will not be deemed a new result for
this purpose: Blake v. City and County of San Francisco, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1884.
PAYMENT.
Check of Third Party.-To pay for a bill of goods, the buyer sent to
the seller a check, drawn by one bank upon another, endorsed by the
buyer to whose order the check was payable, and the seller on receiving
it, sent back to the buyer a receipt acknowledging payment of the bill.
At the time of sending the check by the buyer, and the receipt by the
seller, it was supposed by the buyer and seller that it was good, but in
fact there, were no funds of the drawer in the hands of the drawee sub-
ject to the payment of the check at the time it was drawn or after-
wards. Held, that in an action on an account for goods sold and de-
livered, a plea of payment cannot be maintained on the facts above
stated: Fleig v. Sleet, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
RAILROAD. See Negligence; Common Carrier.
Power to Connect-Right to run through 0ity-Terminus of Route.-
A charter which authorized a railroad company to run its road from the
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boundary between the states of South Carolina and Georgia to the city
of Augusta, and, with the assent of the railroads in this state, to join its
track to theirs, did not confer upon it the power to run its road through
the city of Augusta so as to connect with another railroad. In order
to do .this express authority must be granted by the legislature; City
Council v. Port Royal and Augusta Railway, 71 or 72 Ga.
REmoVAL Or CAu Es.
Objection that the Application was too late may be Waived.-Sect. 3
of the Act of March 3, 1875, prescribing the time when a petition for
removal may be filed, &c., is not jurisdictional but modal and fornial;
application in due time and the proffer of a proper bond,.as required by
it, may be waived, either expressly or by implication; and the party at
whose instance a removal has been effected, is estopped from objecting
that the application therefor was too late; Ayers v. Watson, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1884.
SLANDER.
Testimony of Witness-Privileged Communication.-In an action of
slander the petition charge defendant with having spoken certain false,
malicious and defamatory words concerning the plaintiff, while giving
his testimony before a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter
then on trial, mu answer to interrogatories put to him as such witness.
For aught that is stated in the petition, these answers were relative to
the issue then on trial, and were honestly believed to be true, though
in fact they were untrue. Upon demurrer to the petition, held, 1st.
That the court will presume, in the absence of an averment to the con-
trary, that the answers of the witness were within the scope of inquiry
pertinent to the issue then on trial, and that they were believed by the
witness to be true. 2d. That upon the statements of the petition and
the presumptions arising therefrom, the witness was absolutely privi-
leged, and he is not liable to a civil action for so testifying: Liles v.
Gaston, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Contempt-Enforcement of Decree.-When, on decree for specific
performance, the defendant is in contempt for refusal to perform, the
court may give it effect by establishing the contract as if it had been
executed ; and by enjoining and restraining the defendant from denying
its execution and delivery and from defending himself in any action
by denying its execution : Wiarton v. Stoutenburgh, 39 N. J. Eq.
Such substituted decree, made while the defendant is in contempt,
may be without notice, but he has the right of appeal therefrom: Id.
STATUTE. See Constitutional Law.
Construction-Tunctuation.-In construing a statute, punctuation
may aid, but does not control, unless other means fail ; and in rendering
the meaning of a statute, punctuation may be changed or disregarded:
Albright v. Payne, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
Judicial cognisance of Local Law.-It is the duty of the courts to
take judicial cognisance of public local laws, within the sphere of their
operation, equally with public general laws: Slymer v. Maryland,
62 Md.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
STREET. See Iifunicipal Corporation.
SUNDAY.
Publication of Ordinance on.-Publication of the preliminary and
other ordinances, with respect to a street improvement, in a newspaper
of general circulation, in accordance with the terms of the statute, is
a valid and legal publication, although such newspaper is only published
on Sunday : Hastings v. City of Columbus, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
TAX AND TAXATION. See Municipal Corporation; National Bank.
TRUST. See Will.
TRUSTEES.
Orphans' Court- Opening Account.-The orphans' court has the
power to open a decree settling an intermediate account of trustees, in
which it appears that commissions were allowed in excess of the sum
fixed by the statute: Jackson v. Reynolds, 39 N. J. Eq.
USURY.
Suit by Principal after Payment of Debt.-Where a principal debtor
conveyed land to his surety, to indemnify him against loss, and, after
the debt. had been reduced to judgment and a levy made, the surety
paid off the execution, and thereupon brought ejectment against his
principal to recover the land, it was'no defence to this action to allege
that there was usury in the contract between the principal and the ori-
ginal creditors. The deed from the principal to the surety was not
tainted with usury in the contract between the principal and his cred-
itors; and as between them, the judgment fixed the indebtedness: .Ma-
ples v. Cox, 71 or 72 Ga.
WILL.
Devie- Condition as to .Membership of Religious Order-Public
Policy- 7rust-Charity-Muninipal Corporation-Equity.-It is not
against public policy to make a devise or bequest dependent upon the con-
dition that the legatee should withdraw from the priesthood, or member-
ship of any order or society connected with the Roman Catholic Church,
or refrain from forming any such connection ; and testator has the
right to make the enjoyment of his bounty dependent upon such condi-
tion attached to it: Barnum v. Mayor, &c., of Baltimore, 62 Md.
Under its charter, the city of Baltimore has the power to accept and
hold in trust, any property for educational and charitable purposes: Id.
Where property is held by a municipal corporation in trust, or where
the trust reposed in the corporation is for a charity within the scope of
its duties, h court of chancery will prevent the misapplication of the
trust funds, and compel the execution of the trust. And this jurisdic-
tion is not founded upon the statute of 43 Elizabeth, ch. 4, but is a
part of the original inherent jurisdiction of the court of chancery over
the subject of trusts: Id.
